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AN OLD METHODOLOGY IN A NEW WORLD: A COMMENT ON OUR CURRENT 
SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN TAX CASES 
JUSTINDABNER' 
The traditional approach to resolving tax disputes adopted by the judiciary is to look to the 
words of the legislation to identifY parliament's intelltioll. However this approach is founded on 
the fallacy that words have a 'correct' meanillg which is there for the judiciOlY to discover. In 
fact," language is inherently imprecise and, typically, in difflculi tax cases the detennination of 
how the legislatioll was meant to apply to the facts of the particular case is at best a guess. Yet, 
as if in fear of a great lie being discovered, the judiciOly will seek to clothe their guess with 
respectability by employing rhetorical devices designed to persuade the reader that they have 
identified the undeniable truth. However, ultimately, such a subtelfuge does not do justice to the 
·parties to the litigation nor establish an effective precedent. These cases fail a cost-benefit 
analysis. They indicate that a new approach is needed that is prepared to acknowledge the 
inherent uncertainty of language and to seek to establish a precedent by reference to the 
underlying policy objectives of the legislation. This will require mechanisms to assist the courts 
to identifY the relevalll policy consideratiollS and to ensure that justice is done in the case at 
hand. 
I INTRODUCTION 
A definition of insanity is doing the same thing but expecting a different result. 
Such is an apt description of our belief that the uncertainty in the tax law can be resolved 
through the traditional system of litigation and judicial rulings. The taxation community keenly 
awaits the next High Court decision that Will resolve a difficult area of tax law, but it never 
comes. Each High Court decision is met with disappointment, critical disclaim and the 
identification of further grey areas and difficulties. Yet we sprout the creed that we require a 
further High Court decision to clarify the issues. . 
Why is this so? Burton has presented a cogent, albeit controversial, explanation.' He explained 
that the idea that judicial decisions are 'correct' is a fallacy. This arises from the misplaced belief 
that in tax law disputes there is one undeniable truth that the judiciary is charged With finding 
and thought to be capable of identifying. Rather, he suggested that judges are, after all, only 
human and their views on tax issues are only as 'correct' as those of anyone else, or at least those 
of anyone with considerable intellect and tax learning. Thus judicial decisions are simply 
justifications of one person's view. However, with a view to convincing us that their decisions 
are ' correct,' judges adopt certain rhetorical devices. For example, they might refer to common 
sense, various rules of interpretation, past precedent and fairness . 
• PhD (Tas), B Comm LLB (Hans) (Tas); Associate Professor, Law School, James Cook University. 
I Mark Burton, 'The Rhetoric of Tax Interpretation: Where Talking the Talk Is Not Vlalking the Walk' (Paper 
_prcsent.ecLauhe Australasjan Tax Teachers' Association CQnferel1~, . Wellington. 26-28 JanuarY 2005), Sir Neil 
MacCormick has previously expressed similar views but now sees the circumstances in which judges make the 
law, as distinct from deducing it from interpretational practice, as less common: see Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric 
and 'he Rule of Law (2005). 
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So the 'correct' judicial decision is really the one that sounds the most convincing in the sense 
of appealing to rhetorical devices. At least this is the case for lower court judges who must be 
able to convince appeal judges. Of course, ultimately the 'correct' decision will be that of the 
majority at the highest level to which the case is appealed, although even their decisions are 
subject to the caveat that if they are not sufficiently convincing they may be subsequently 
rejected or, more deferentially, distinguished by a court of equal standing. 
Burton's thesis rests on the notion that there is no single correct view of the underlying tax 
legislation which the judiciary is considering. This is because legislation is a product of words 
and language is an imperfect and imprecise mechanism for describing intention. If Burton's 
thesis is an accurate description of what judges really do and how tax disputes are resolved, then 
what are the implications? The author has previously argued that faced with this new reality we 
need to change the way in which we resolve and settle tax disputes to recognise the fallacy of the 
belief that the answer can always be found in the words of Parliament.' I have attempted to 
illustrate, by reference to cases dealing with the general anti-avoidance rule in Part IVA of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (,ITAA36'), that the traditional approach adopted by the 
judiciary simply creates another level of complexity and uncertainty. Furthermore, the 
methodology employed tends toward futile attempts to divine the 'correct' meaning oflegislation 
thereby failing to address what would be a much more worthy consideration, namely, what is 
best for the economic and social well-being of the country. 
My argument is that the traditional approach to attempting to find the answer from the words 
used by Parliament results in a technical analysis of semantics and minutiae. Burton would add 
that in an effort to make each decision sound correct the judiciary utilise a plethora of often 
competing rhetorical devices that result in inconsistency. 
I suggest that the current approach needs to be abandoned and there should be recognition of 
the fact that legislation is inherently uncertain and that the cost of this uncertainty needs to be 
appropriately shared by the community. To this end I have identified eight strategies that should 
be adopted. 
Legislative purposive rule. As a starting point, there should be an express mandate in the tax 
legislation requiring the courts to interpret the legislation to give effect to its underlying 
purpose and to read words into a provision if necessary to further its purpose. Whilst the 
purposive approach is not without its limitations, this might restrict the use of competing 
rhetorical devices by the judiciary and see most cases resolved in a way that Parliament 
would presumably have considered to be in the best interests of the country.' 
2 PllIposive legislatioll alld objects clauses. To assist the judiciary to ascertain the purpose of 
legislation, a drafting methodology that abandons detailed legislation in favour of statements 
of broader principle and the use of objects clauses should be adopted. However, it is 
acknowledged that due to the inherent uncertainty of language the debate over how best to 
draft tax legislation is of secondary significance. At least less detailed legislation is less 
likely to obscure the underlying purpose. 
2 Justin Dabner. 'There Are Too Many Witchdoctors in Our Tax Courts: Is There a Better Way'!1Papcr presentcd3T 
the Australasian Tax Teachers' Association Conference, Wellington, 26-28 January 2005). 
3 But sec below n 36 and n 38 on the competing theories behind the legislative process. 
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3 Unfettered reference to extrinsic material. Abandoning the rule that Parliament's purpose is 
to be found solely in the words of a provision would permit the judiciary to refer to 
whatever extrinsic material is considered useful and give it the appropriate weight. 
4 Substallce over form. Substance should dominate as the inquiry before the courts must be as 
to the manner in which Parliament intended a given economic result to be managed. 
5 ["determinable purpose - Adopt the best policy solutioll. Where the purpose(s) of the 
legislation is obscure or it does not assist in resolving the issue at hand, the judiciary should 
undertake a policy analysis and openly decide the matter by reference to the preferred policy 
outcome . 
. 6 Expanded discretion in quallti/Yillg liability. Given the imperfections oflanguage, innocent 
taxpayers may have been positively misled by the legislation, especially where a court has 
adopted a broad purposive approach or policy analysis. Therefore, the judiciary should be 
provided with an expanded discretion to quantifY liability by taking into account the clarity 
by which tax policy has been expressed and the taxpayer's conduct. This could extend from 
simply refraining from entering a costs order through to negative penalties or discounts off 
the tax liability. Furthermore, a fund should be established to compensate taxpayers who 
have incurred expense arising from their interpretation of what has been held by a court or 
the tax policy committee (see point seven below) to be misleading legislation but whose 
cases did not proceed to litigation. In this way the inherent costs arising from the 
imprecision of language could be borne by the community generally rather than by 
individual taxpayers. 
7 Tax policy committee. A tax policy committee should be established with representatives 
from relevant stakeholders such as the Australian Taxation Office ('ATO'), the Treasury, the 
Australian Council of Social Service, business and the profession. The Committee's primary 
role would be to enunciate the perceived policy behind tax legislation, or a desirable policy 
direction where the existing policy is unclear, and to monitor whether tax rulings reflect this 
policy. Applications could be made to the Committee by a taxpayer (following an adverse 
decision on a ruling application by the ATO). The deliberations of the Committee would not 
be binding on courts but would provide highly persuasive evidence of either the existing or 
desirable policy position and, therefore, would be unlikely to be contested.' 
8 A 'norm campaigll' to change cOlllllllwity vallles. There is evidence to suggest that 
taxpayer perceptions of unfairness, excessive taxation and regulation are determinants that 
contribute to avoidance of their obligations under the tax system.' In order to improve the 
4 The ATO GAAR Panel is heading in th is direction: ATO, Law Administration Practice Statemen t PS LA 2005124 
(2005). This has been discussed in a paper by the (fonner) Federal Commissioner of Taxation: Michael Carmody 
'Corporate Governance and Its Role in Tax' (Paper presented at the Taxation Institute National Convention 'Tax 
Unmasked', Perth, 17 March 2005). 
S See Valerie Braithwaite, 'Perceptions of Who's Not Paying Their Fair Share' (Working Paper No 54, Centre for 
Tax System Integrity, Australian National University, Canberra, 2004); G Richardson, 'An Exploratory Cross-
cultural Study of Tax Fairness Perceptions and Tax Compliance Behaviour in Australia and Hong Kong' (2005) 31 
Internatioflal Tax Journal 11 and M Richardson and A J Sawyer, 'A Taxonomy of the Tax Compliance Literature: 
Further Findings, Problems and Prospects' (2001) 16 Australian Tax Forum 137, 148, 177-84. As recent research 
indicates, the relationship between personal ethics and perceiv~d sQ.ciaLnorrns on the one hand and tax compliance 
on the other is complicated: M Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalization? Casual Relations between Ethics, Norms 
and Tax Compliance (2005) Centre for Tax System Integrity, Australian National University 
<http://ctsLanu.edu.aulpublicationsltaxpubslWenzeUEP2.pdf> at 6 June 2006. 
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public perception of the tax system a campaign should be instituted to persuade taxpayers 
that they have both a legal and moral obligation to pay tax in pursuit of the Government's 
(now more transparent) socio-economic objectives. This campaign would emphasise the 
moral obligation to contribute to the cost of public resources as well as the legal sanctions 
for failing to comply. It might also encourage whistle-blowing and seek to render those who 
are non-compliant, especially non-compliant corporations, public pariahs. In contrast, in 
support of good citizenship the campaign might (with their consent) publicise the names of 
the highest tax paying corporations and individuals. One consequence of this campaign 
might be added pressure on tax advisers to bring a broader, even moral, dimension to the 
provision oftheir tax advice.' 
Ultimately, I suggest that we are in denial if we believe that the current system of tax dispute 
resolution can ever deliver more clarity and certainty. Our reluctance to change is costing us 
dearly. The community is not receiving good value for its expenditure on the judiciary and tax 
court structure. This article further discusses the inadequacies of the current judicial tax dispute 
resolution system and elaborates on the proposed reforms above. It will be demonstrated that the 
reforms are not as radical, as they may appear as there is already some precedent in mandates 
expressed in other areas of economic law for a more policy orientated approach by the judiciary. 
II THE TRADITIONAL ApPROACH TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN TAX CASES 
FAILS CONTEMPORARY NEEDS 
The universal approach of common law tax judges is to seek to resolve a case by identifying 
the 'true' or 'correct' meaning of the legislation: that is, to identify the intention of Parliament 
from the words used in the statute.' 
My thesis is that typically tax disputes arise because it is simply impossible to determine what 
Parliament intended from its words. We often observe Parliament respond to a judicial decision it 
does not like by enacting further legislation, that is, more words. But typically this simply 
generates new issues for resolution and again the judiciary becomes involved. The result is that 
we see the growth of legislation spiralling out of control and judicial decisions generating more 
uncertainty and complexity. The administration of, and compliance with, the system becomes a 
massive burden. Ultimately the public loses confidence in it and there are continual demands for 
reform. 
A An Illustration: FCT v HartS 
A perfect illustration of this is the High Court's most recent pronouncement on the general anti-
avoidance provisions of Part IVA of the ITAA36 in Hart. In his speech at the launch of the 
6 McBamctt suggests that tackling tax avoidance through general principle drafting, a substance over form 
approach and purposive interpretation by the judiciary and the implementation of a GAAR will just lead to 
creative compliance, which is a problem not a solution. She argues the need to change the attitudes of taxpayers 
and taxpayer advisers toward taxation so that it is seen as a positive contribution, not a negative imposition: D 
McBarnett. 'When Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in 
AttifUae"in valene BraIthwaite (ed») Jaxlllg Democracy: Understanaing lax AV01QanCe arfllJaXEvaslon (2003)~ 
7 See, for example, Gary Heilbronn et ai )inlroducing the Law (5th ed, 1996) at 137 and following. 
S (2004) 217 CLR 216 (,Hart'). 
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publication Global Challenges in Tax Administration,' Sir Anthony Mason referred to the 
adherence of Australian courts to a narrow conception of judicial power and the failure to 
creatively interpret statutes. It is not surprising to the author that he thereafter made specific 
reference to the decision in Hart as not having done much to lessen the conflicts and tensions 
that exist within the tax laws. The facts were that the taxpayers took out a wealth optimiser split 
loan product to enable them to purchase a home and retain their former residence as an 
investment property. The product was structured such that in the early years of the loan all 
repayments were directed towards paying off the home loan while allowing the interest on the 
investment property loan to be capitalised. Interest was then imposed on the capitalised portion. 
In essence, the progressive shift of the loan balance from the residential side of the account to the 
investment side permitted interest on the loan funds used to purchase the Harts' home to be 
claimed as a tax deduction. 
The High Court held, overruling a urianimous Full Federal Court, that the tax benefit associated 
with the loan was subject to Part IVA. According to the transcript, a key reason for leave to 
appeal to the High Court being granted was to clarify the operation of the definition of 'scheme' 
for the purposes of Part IV A.1O In fact, the decision has done anything but provide clarity. The 
pivotal decision of Callinan J is open to competing interpretations. One interpretation would see 
the Commissioner's powers under Part IVA expanded, while the alternative interpretation would 
merely reinforce the status quo that has prevailed since the first High Court decision on Part IVA 
in FCTv Peabody." 
The uncertainty which the High Court decision created is illustrated by Hill J's subsequent 
attempt to make sense of it in Macquarie Finance Ltd v FeY". His Honour clearly had great 
difficulty identifying a precedent on the meaning of 'scheme' from the High Comt decision. 
Fortunately for his Honour, the facts pClmitted him to avoid having to reach a decided view on 
the scope of the scheme. T.ntimately, whilst concluding with reluctance that Part IVA (as 
interpreted in Hart) applied, his Honour expressed doubt as to whether this would have been 
Parliament's intention when Part IVA was enacted." 
9 Sir Anthony Mason, <Global Challenges ill Tax Administratioll Launch' (Speech delivered at the Global 
Challenges in Tax Administration Launch, Sydney. 18 August 2005). 
)0 See the transcript of the special leave application: Commissio1ler of Taxation v Hart S279/2002 11 April 2003 
(especially the submissions of Shaw QC for the Commissioner at page 4). 
11 (1994) 181 CLR 359. For a discussion of the possible interpretation of the decision in Hart sec Mark Burton and 
Justin Dabner, 'Hart - The Death of Tax Planning?' CCH Tax Week Issue 24, 24 June 2004; P Donovan, 'The 
Aftermath of Hart's Case - A Case for Reform of Part IVA?' (2004) 39 Taxation in Australia 253; Dominic 
Carbone and John Tretola, 'Does Hart's Case Change the Application of Part IVA?' (Paper presented at the 
Australasian Tax Teachers' Association Conference, Wellington, 26·28 January 2005); Michael D'Ascenzo, 'Part 
IVA: Post Hart ' (2004) 7 Journal oj Australian Taxation 357. 
12 [2004] FCA II 70. 
13 On appeal a majority of the Full Federal Court disagreed with Hill J on the application of Part IVA to the facts 
whi lst expressly endorsing his Honour's summary of the relevant law: Macquarie Finance Ltd v Commissioner of 
Taxation [2005] FCAFC 205. Hill J elaborated on his view as to how Hart may have significantly expanded the 
application of Part IVA in 'The Incremental Expansion of Part IVA' (2005) 40 Taxation in Australia 23. See also 
Justin Dabner, 'So Just What Did Hart Decide: Macquarie Final/ce' CCH Tax Week, Issue 45, 18 November 2004; 
M Cashmere, 'Part IVA after Harf' (2004) 33 Australian Tax Review 131; P Donovan, 'The Aftermath of Hart's 
Case - A Case for Reform of Part IVA?' (2004) 39 Taxation ill Australia 253. It must be acknowledged that the 
..AIQj:Jocs not share the view of his Honour and most other cqrnmcntators that the decision does not clarify but 
confuse: Michael D'Ascenzo, 'Part IVA: Post Hart' (2004) 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 357. However, a 
comparison of the conclusions in that article with conclusions drawn by others would not support the ATO's 
position. For example, on the critical issue whether the case rejects the view that a scheme needs to stand on its 
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The decisions at alllevels in the Hart litigation were classic tax judgments in the sense that the 
focus of the judges was to identifY the true application of Part IVA through consideration of its 
language. Thus the decisions degenerated into a debate over semantics and minutiae, the main 
focus of which was the definition of the word 'scheme'. On one argument, if the ATO could 
select a narrow scheme of, say, the borrowing on its own, then it might be easier to conclude that 
the dominant purpose of the scheme was to secure a tax benefit. On the other hand, a 
requirement to identifY within the scheme commercial motivations for the borrowing might lead 
to a different conclusion. Thus argument centred on what scheme the Commissioner could select 
and whether the facts selected had to 'stand on their own feet ' and not be 'robbed ofall practical 
meaning', 14 
Alternatively, it may not matter now exactly what the test is for determining the relevant 
scheme, as the scheme (whatever it is) must be viewed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances in any event" Of course, this begs the question as to what are the relevant 
surrounding circumstances and how they are weighted. The relaxation of the 'scheme' 
requirement places even greater importance on the application of s 177D of the ITAA36 (factors 
to consider in identifYing the dominant purpose) in striking an appropriate application of the 
Part. Arguably the approach adopted by the courts to date in distilling a dominant purpose from 
these factors has essentially been a 'smell test ' rather than a scientific approach. The approach 
generally has been to make a conclusion 'on balance' from a consideration of these factors." 
Although the Commissioner has, following his success in Hart, undertaken to apply Part IVA in 
a 'practical' way" it is possible that the next High Court case concerning Part IVA will have to 
consider this very issue. 
In support of the positions taken by the judges in Hart, we can see that the judges rely on many 
tried and tested rhetorical devices." Thus, Gummow and Hayne JJ suggest that a test they 
disavow is 'far from clear' and where it was used before it was 'used in a very different 
context'." In any event there is no basis for the introduction of a 'judicial gloss' into the 
ITAA36.'· Furthermore, at one stage Callinan J employs a literal interpretation in his judgment." 
Nowhere in any of the judgments is there any attempt to examine the issue under consideration 
from a policy perspective. 
own feet, contrast the views of 0' Asccnzo with those expressed in the otherwise supportive analysis of the case 
by Dominic Carbone and John Tretola, 'Docs Hart's Case Change the Application of Part IVA?' (Paper presented 
at the Australasian Tax Teachers' Conference, Wellington 26·28 January 2005), 15-18. Thus. even those rare 
supporters of the case are unable to agree on what it decided. 
14 See, eg, (2004) 217 CLR 216, 235-241, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
" See the discussion by Hill J in Macg"arie Finance Ltd v FCr [2004) FCA 1170, (especially from paragraph 110) 
and the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Federal Commissioner o/Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216, 
241-5. 
16 FCrv Sleight 2004 ATC 4477, 4492, Hill J. 
17 Michael Carmody, 'Corporate Governance and Its Role in Tax' (paper presented at the Taxation [nstitute National 
Convention 'Tax Unmasked', Perth, 17 March 2005). 
IS Referred to by Mark Burton, 'The Rhetoric of Tax Interpretation: Where Talking the Talk Is Not Walking the 
Walk' (paper presented at the Australasian Tax Teachers' Association Conference, Wellington, 26-28 January 
2005). 
1'9 (2004) 217 CLR 216, 237 - 238. 
,. Ibid. 
21 Ibid 259-60. 
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B A Cost Benefit Analysis a/Hart 
In this section, I seek to analyse whether the community received good value for the resources 
allocated to Hart ~ case. First, was justice achieved between the parties, namely the taxpayers 
and the ATO? It must be appreciated that the amount of deductions at issue in the case was only 
around $800." The Harts subsequently made public comment to the effect that they did not have 
tax considerations predominately in mind when they took out the loan." That is, there was no 
evidence of serious malfeasance and the tax revenue in question was minimal. 
Secondly, did Hart create a valuable precedent to aid the future interpretation of the tax laws? 
It is notable that no cost orders were sought by the ATO which saw the case as a test case." 
Certainly the taxation of split loan products was resolved in favour of the ATO. However, the 
basis of the special leave application being upheld was that the High Court wished to establish a 
precedent clarifying Part IVA. The preponderance of both academic and judicial analysis to date 
considers that it is difficult to determine what the case stands for; on one view, it may be a 
considerable departure from previous learning and possibly Parliament's intention when the 
legislation was enacted." 
These could be considered to be marginal returns to the community in terms of revenue, 
justice, or the establishment of clear precedent. Given this, it is appropriate to reflect on how 
much the decision cost and whether these funds could have been more effectively employed 
elsewhere. It is very difficult to calculate the cost of the case without access to the financial 
records of the various parties involved. The table on the following page is a legal academic's 
attempt to approximate what the cost might have been, subject to some very coarse assumptions. 
This rough estimate is sufficient for current purposes to support the proposition that the attempt 
to resolve through the court system as to how Part IVA is meant to apply is a very costly process. 
The resolution of its application to one type of transaction, namely the split loan product, has 
cost the parties involved around $1.2 million and we remain no wiser as to its application 
generally. 
The opportunity to create the split loan product under consideration in Hart only came about 
because of uncertainty as to how the tax laws apply, especially the application of Part IVA. 
Therefore, the Table on the following pages includes the costs of generating the product and a 
proxy for the costs of its subsequent marketing, sale and implementation." Added to these 
expenses are the ATO's costs in reaching a position on the product and the costs of the 
subsequent dispute with the taxpayer. The Table attempts to identify the cost for each group of 
relevant stakeholders, namely the financial community (including the taxpayer), the ATO and the 
public court system. 
22 See F Buffini, 'Loan Was Not a Rort'. The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 28 May 2004 at 4. 
" Ibid. 
24 It is widely believed that the ATO's focus in litigating the case to the High Court was to obtain a precedent that 
might override the Full Federal Court decision in Eastern Nitrogen v FCT 2001 ATC 4164 which had upheld the 
tax effectiveness of sale and lease back financing arrangements. The High Court had refused leave to appeal on 
the Part IVA point in Eastern Nitrogen on the basis that there was no error of law at issue. Commissioner of 
Taxation v Eastern Nitrogen Ltd B28/2001 (15 February 2002). The ATO was concerned that this had been 
interpreted as an endorsement of the approach and decis ion of the Full Federal Court in that case. 
2S In particular see Hill J in Macquarie Finance Limited v FCT [2004] FCA 1170 at paragrapfiTfO-:-
26 This takes into account expenses such as printing of brochures, advertising generally, training sales statl~ 
establishing relevant accounts and maintaining records. 
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There are likely to have been many more indirect costs which would be difficult to quantifY 
(and unnecessary for the purposes of this rough approximation). For example, there would have 
been many other taxpayers who purchased the split loan or a similar product (maybe after 
obtaining advice) and who may have either been the subject of a dispute with the ATO or who 
subsequently voluntarily amended their relevant assessments. Both taxpayers and the ATO would 
have incurred financial, accounting and legal expenses and possibly interest and penalties. There 
would have been considerable professional (and, indeed, academic) time devoted to 
understanding the product and its tax implications at the various stages of its life; from 
generation, to ATO ruling, to the various court decisions. These costs can all be related back to 
the product's initial creation, conceived from the uncertainty in the way our tax laws have been 
and are interpreted. 
Set out here are some assumptions used in preparing the Table. 
I The relevant hourly rates adopted are those reflecting the likely cost to the relevant 
stakeholder. So, for example, in the case of public court costs the rate for the judiciary is 
their likely employment cost rather than any charge out rate based on opportunity costs. 
2 The financial communities' internal hourly rate is assumed to be an average of $100 per 
hour, with legal and tax advisers and junior counsel at $400 per hour and senior counsel at 
$600 per hour. 
3 The ATO's internal hourly rate is also assumed at $100 per hour with their legal and advisers 
at $400 per hour and counsel at $600 per hour. 
4 The hourly employment rate for the judiciary is assumed at $200 per hour. 
S Fixed and variable court costs include court staff such as security, judges' associates, 
transcribers, bailiffs and the cost of the infrastructure. This is assumed at $1000 per hour. 
Given the inclusion of these amounts application and appeal fees payable by the parties have 
not been included. 
6 The decisions record that the hearing took two days, the Full Federal Court appeal one day 
and it is assumed that the High Court appeal took a further day. Given preparation time, ten 
hour days are assumed. 
It is argued that even if the assumptions used in preparing the Table are inaccurate in many 
respects, the Table nevertheless illustrates that the legal process by which the application of Part 
IVA to split loan products was resolved is likely to have been very costly. As with the interest at 
issue, the cost of uncertainty in the application of Part IVA continues to compound - even after 
resolution of the case itself and the closing down of the split loan scheme. The cost of the High 
Court's failure to provide a clear precedent on the application of Part IVAgeneral/y continues to 
resonate as hours of professional, academic and judicial time are spent on attempting to distil 
some sense from the case and identifY its implications. Some might argue that this uncertainty 
helps to discourage tax avoiders. However it might also discourage economically desirable 
activity as even the Commissioner acknowledges that businesses thrive on certainty." Economic 
impact statements now typically accompany tax reform proposals and tax bills. It may be a 
worthwhile exercise for such statements to be drawn up in relation to tax cases so that we, as a 
community, can start to focus on their true costs and benefits. 
27 Michael Carmody. 'Corporate Governance and Its Role in Tax ' (Paper presented at the Taxation Institute National 
Convention 'Tax Unmasked', Perth, 17 March 2005). 
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Table: What did the decision in Hart cost? 
Activity Time (hours Cost ($) 
Taxpayc ATO Courts Taxpaye ATO Court Total 
r 1 rl s 
Financial Financia l 
Sector Sector 
Product Development 5001 50,000 130,000 
(In-house/External 200 80,000 
Advisers) 
Marketing) Sale & 3,000 300,000 300,000 
Implementation 
Ruling by ATO 500 5,000 5,000 
FiTst Objections & 10 4,000 4,000 
Advice 
Amended Assessment 50 5,000 5,000 
Second Objections & 10 4,000 4,000 
Advice 
Reconsiderat ion by 50 5,000 5,000 
ATO 
Referral to Federal 10 4,000 4,000 
Court 
Pre-trial Activities 10 10 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Preparation for Trial 25 25 10,000 10,000 20,000 
Solicitors at First 20 20 8,000 8,000 16,000 
Instance 
Counsel at First I SCx I QCx 12,000 12,000 48,000 
Instance 20 20 16,000 8,000 
2 JC x 20 I JC x 
20 
Judge at First Instance 20 4,000 4,000 
FixedNariable Court 20 20,00 20,000 
Costs 0 
Writing Judgment 100 20,00 20,000 
0 
Review by ATO and 10 10 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Taxpayer 
Full Federal Court 10 4,000 4,000 
Appeal Application 
Review by ATO 10 4,000 4,000 
Preparation for Full 25 25 30 10,000 10,000 6,000 26,000 
Federal Court 
Solicitors on Full 10 10 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Federal Court Appeal 
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Activity Time (hours Cost ($) 
Taxpayer I ATO Courts Taxpayer! ATO Courts Total 
Financial Financial 
Sector Sector 
Counsel on Full Federal I SCx I QCx 6,000 16,000 
Court Appeal 10 10 6,000 4,000 
I JC x 
10 
Thrcc Judges on Full 30 6,000 6,000 




Writing Judgments 150 300,0 300,000 
(One principal 00 
j udgment at 100 hours 
and two additional 
j udgments at 25 hours) 
Review by ATO and 10 10 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Taxpayer 
Leave Application 10 4,000 4,000 
Review and Preparation 10 10 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Solicitors on I I 400 400 800 
Application (Assume 1 
hour) 
Counsel on Application I SCx I I QCx 600 600 2,000 
(Assume I hour) I JCx I I 400 400 
I JCx I 
Judges on Appl ication I 200 200 
(2 x 30 minutes) 
FixedNariablc Court I 1,000 
Costs 
Preparation for High 25 25 50 10,000 10,000 10,00 30,000 
Court 0 
Solicitors on High 10 10 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Court Appeal 
Counsel on High Court I SCx 2QCx 6,000 12,000 26,000 
Appeal 10 10 4,000 4,000 
I JC x 10 I JCx 
10 
Five Judges on Appeal 50 10,000 
FixedlVariable Court 10 10,000 
Costs 
Wri ting Judgments (3 at 300 60,000 
100 hours each) 
Implementation of 10 1,000 1,000 
Decision 
Analys is of 100 100 10,000 10,000 20,000 




My proposition is that there must be a way to generate a better return for the community from 
the investment in tax cases. Cases that focus on semantics and minutiae will inevitably be a futile 
investment. Unfortunately, with occasional exceptions, the judicial mindset is to focus on the 
words rather than any bigger picture. It is as if the words present a comfort zone which permit 
wider issues, such as economic well-being and social equity, to be avoided. 
Perhaps it is unfair to solely blame the judiciary, as the tax advisory profession is all too ready 
to hide behind literal interpretations of the law in order to avoid considerations of what might be 
socially acceptable and ethical behaviour. Legal academics continue to teach the study oflaw in 
a traditional way with only limited reference to normative issues." 
III THE ALTERNATIVE Is NOT So RADICAL 
The alternative approach I have proposed is really not so radical. It acknowledges that there 
will be cases where it is impossible to ascertain how Parliament intended the transaction to be 
taxed and any attempt to determine Parliament's intention froin the words would be mere 
speculation. Furthermore, any attempt to justifY the decision reached would be merely an 
exercise in rhetoric that might be readily rejected in subsequent cases. The result is a 
determination lacking precedential value and generating further uncertainty. 
A A Better Approach 
The better approach in such cases would be to concede that Parliament's intention is unclear 
and to apply an overriding principle to the decision, namely, what is best for the country. The 
judiciary would then state the law by reference to the underlying principles of our taxation 
system which might be articulated as first, raising revenue for the government; second, achieving 
social equity; and third, advancing the country's economic we1l-being. 
The opposing parties to a case could then lead evidence and address arguments to support their 
preferred interpretation of the law with reference to these principles. Ultimately the judiciary 
would be required to make a value-laden decision but it would be made with express reference to 
the values that the judges are advancing. Should these be inconsistent with the preferred policies 
of the government, then the government would be in a position to pass amending legislation with 
the benefit of a record of expert testimony and the insight of the judiciary on the relevant policy 
considerations. 
Some might argue that such an approach encourages judicial activism and erodes parliamentary 
sovereignty. It must be appreciated that by virtue of its ability to enact amending legislation 
Parliament has the ultimate power, at least prospectively. There are already illustrations of such 
quasi-legislative authority being invested in administrators and, therefore, ultimately quasi-
judicial and judicial bodies by provisions contained in other economic legislation. For example, 
ss 665A, 669, 673, 741 and 1075A of the Corporations Act 200] (Cth) permit the Australian 
Securities Investment Commission (,ASIC') and, ultimately, the courts to override express 
legislation to give a better effect to the policy behind takeovers and fundraising provisions." In 
28 Grbich takes the view that tax academics need to be more critical of tax judgments and tax lawyers need to be 
better tooled: Yun Grbich. 'New modalities in tax decision-making: applying European experience to Australia' 
(2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 125 . 
. !!_.5ec_also-.-P.art VII of the Trade Practices ACI 1974 (9h)~cially s 88, which empowers the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission to authorise arrangements that would otherwise be antl-competItlVe and 
in breach of the Act. In exercising this power. the Commission is to weigh up how the public interest is best 
served. 
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the context of the voluntary administration provisions, s 447 A of the COIporalions Act empowers 
the courts to make orders about how the provisions are to apply to a particular company with the 
only limit being the aim to further the objects of the provisions. By virtue of these provisions, 
ASIC and the courts are given a very broad discretion and a mandate to ensure that the rights of 
parties affected by their decisions in such cases are protected. Furthermore, this legislation 
contains object clauses.30 In some cases there are well-documented non-legislative 
pronouncements on the policy behind the legislation, another element of the current proposa1." 
B Limitatiolls of Parliamentary Sovereignly 
In any event, it may be time to question the limits of the notion of parliamentary sovereignty, at 
least in the context of the relationship between Parliament and the courts. The notion that 
Parliament is the sovereign law making was adopted into Australia from the United Kingdom, 
where the principle had evolved over centuries of struggle between Parliament and the Crown. 
Initially there was little to distinguish between a judgment and a statute and it can be argued that 
the acceptance of the superiority of Parliament over the judiciary was simply an historical 
accident." Parliament's dominance over the judiciary is certainly less developed in non-common 
law countries." 
The notion of parliamentary sovereignty, including its sovereign~ over the courts, was 
alticulated by the famous constitutional lawyer A V Dicey in the late 19' t century." He explained 
it as Parliament having the right to make laws and no other person or body having the right to 
override the legislation of Parliament. Thus it is that with the stroke of a pen Parliament can 
ovelTide centuries of judge-made law. 
It is not my purpose to attempt to argue against the doctrine that Parliament should be 
sovereign over the judiciary. Rather, I wish to highlight that there was no oracle from high that 
mandated this outcome: the hierarchical relationship simply evolved." There may be good 
reason for this in our system of democracy with Parliaments elected by the people and the 
judiciary merely appointed by the Executive. However this assumes that parliamentarians serve a 
higher purpose than judges. The public choice theory of the legislative process suggests that 
politicians act for self-interested purposes - that is to be re-elected. It might be argued that 
(non-elected) judges are less likely to be influenced by self-interest and so potentially are more 
representative. Of course, they may still harbour ambitions (for example, to be appointed to the 
High Court or as a Governor or Governor-General) and seek further power, prestige and 
influence which might dictate their leanings." What I am proposing here is not a realignment of 
the hierarchy but simply the recognition that where the legislation is ambiguous or silent then the 
30 See, eg, ss 602 (takeovers) and 435A (voluntary administration) Corporatiolls Act 2001 (Cth). 
31 Such as the Eggleston Committee principles in the context of takeovers: Commonwealth, Second Interim Report 
to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General: Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings alld Takeovers, Pari 
Paper No 43 (1969) 6. 
"Sec, eg, Gary Heilbronn et ai, /lIIroc/llcillg the Law (5" ed, 1996) especially 35-38. 
J3 In these jurisdictions, the balance of power is probably closer to a partnership, see Grbich, above n 28. 
34 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (9th cd, 1950), especially 60-1. 
35 The sovereignty of Parliament over the judiciary probably evolved because in the history of the legal system the 
dispensing of justice was a role initially undertaken by the Monarch which was subsequently delegated to the 
courts. 
36 See Richard A Posner, Overcoming Law (1995) ll8; contrast R B Korobkin and T S Vleo, 'Law and Behaviorar 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics' (2000) 88 California Law Review 
1051. 
155 
judiciary should make law by reference to an express policy analysis, rather than pretend to 
divine Parliament's intention from the words of the legislation. Parliament remains empowered 
to subsequently overrule the judiciary with amending legislation. 
C Making Policy-based Decisions 
It would also be naive not to appreciate that in many cases judges do, in fact, decide cases by 
reference to underlying economic and social values, either consciously or sub-consciously. Few 
are prepared to articulate exactly what they are doing but rather they appear constrained to veil 
their decision behind the orthodoxy that they are really just identifYing Parliament's intention 
from the words of the Statute. The proposed approach would liberate the judiciary to be open and 
frank as to the basis for a decision and, indeed, encourage some self-reflection. Such 
transparency can only further our pursuit of a just ahd consistent legal system that complements 
our economic and social agenda. 
There are also those who might suggest that deciding cases on principles of public finance is no 
less problematic than using traditional legal reasoning with all its flaws. This writer is no 
apologist for economics, however I argue that the express reference to underlying economic and 
social policies by judges is a step in the direction of more transparent decisions and proceeds 
from a more acceptable basis, namely, what is best for the country rather than what is the best 
guess at what the words of the legislation mean. Everyday the government makes decisions for 
the country based on public finance theory. Certainly, there is still room for political decisions to 
be made based on a hidden agenda justified by reference to some doubtful public finance 
equation but at least one layer of subterfuge is removed." In other words, whilst public finance 
theory is no magic bullet it is, in the writer's opinion, an improvement on the current system. 
This is, indeed, the path eloquently advocated by Yuri Grbich as long ago as 1980." Whilst 
Grbich took the view then that the current model of judicial decision making in tax cases was 
clearly inadequate and that there was no need to demonstrate this," I am not so convinced that 
this is well appreciated. Hence my discussion of Hart here. 
Grbich proposed a model where judges articulated the social and economic values behind their 
decisions. Whilst this model was based on welfare economics he acknowledged the limitations of 
economic theory but suggested that at least it put the values at play in sharper focus even if it 
was not a complete solution. A primary device to be used to rationalise decisions was the Pareto 
optimality principle, namely a decision might be preferred where it improved the condition of 
those who gained by more than those who 10sl.40 Similarities with the writer 's more simplistic 
37 There are two main theories seeking to explain the legislative process, namely public interest theory (that 
legislation is enacted with the public interest in mind) and public choice theory (that legislation is enacted with 
politicians' and others' self-interest in mind). For an overview of these see W Eskridge, P Frickey and E Garrett, 
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (2000). For a critical appraisal of the public interest theory and one strand 
of public choice theory in the context of the US income tax see D Shaviro, 'Beyond Public Choice and Public 
[nterest: A Study of the Legislative Process as lllustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s' (1990) 139 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
38 Yuri Grbich, 'Is Economics Any Use To Tax Lawyers' (1980) 12 Melbourne University Law Review 340. 
39 Ibid 354. Grbich states that "[t]he old closed rule model is so tattered that it threatens to undermine the credibi lity 
of legal dispute mechanisms." 
40 This was not to deny a role for distributional preferences and other justice reasons in rationalising decisions but 
these were to be expressly acknowledged: ibid, 345-6. 
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'what is best for the country' criterion are clear. Grbich accepted that his new model would 
require lawyers to be better tooled up to engage in economic analysis.41 
Twenty four years later, Grbich derives support for a judicial decision making model focused 
on public policy imperatives from the European experience. This time he calls on Australian tax 
teachers to contribute to the development of a culture of accountability by judges by being 
prepared to criticise the judiciary in how they deal with policy and principles when making 
decisions. Furthermore, principles and legal philosophy should be at the heart of the teaching of 
taxation law." After criticising 'sterile definitional debates' in tax decisions, he suggests that a 
more principled approach would 'prevent fundamental principles from being submerged in a 
self-justifying spiral of mindless technical analysis feeding on itself.'4) And later he describes the 
result of the current methodology as 'barren'verbal analysis and technical minutiae wag[ging) the 
policy dog.' In his view 'we must not suffer the hijacking of core policy decisions by low-level 
debates about words in a vacuum or the exercise of judicial discretion hidden behind a jungle of 
complexity. '44 
The judgments in Hart unfortunately provide the perfect illustration of what Grbich is speaking 
about. 
IV CONCLUSION 
My analysis of the costs and benefits of the Hart case illustrates that the resolution of tax 
disputes imposes a huge cost on the community. I argue that we are not are we obtaining value 
for our investment. 
The application of traditional legal reasoning to the interpretation of obscure tax legislation 
does not pass a cost-benefit analysis. This reasoning seeks to identify Parliament's intention from 
the words of the legislation. However, typically in difficult cases Parliament's intention can not 
be discerned and the judges' best guess results in recourse to doubtful rhetorical devices in an 
effort to justify the conclusion reached. Slavish adherence to the fallacy that the 'correct' 
meaning of the legislation is there to be ultimately divined by the judiciary can lead to sub-
optimum outcomes and precedents that do not provide the community with any certainty. This 
failure of the system is then destined to repeat itself. 
In such cases, I recommend that courts embrace an approach that acknowledges the inherent 
uncertainty of language and seeks to establish a precedent based on desirable policy objectives. 
This would necessitate mechanisms to assist the courts in identifying the various policy 
objectives behind the legislation and some protections to ensure that justice is done between the 
parties in the case at hand. Some image marketing of the tax system to address negative public 
perceptions and encourage a consideration of wider socio-economic factors by taxpayers and 
advisers alike might also be desirable. 
In the absence of a new approach the tax system will continue in its trajectory towards greater 
complexity and uncertainty. Ultimately it will become the subject of public condemnation and 
ridicule, the first signs of which, we may already be witnessing. 
41 Ibid 349. 
42 Grbich. above n 28, especially 152 - 154. 
~id.l!U. 
44 Ibid 153. Here, Grbich also suggests the need to strengthen other delegated tax decision-making institutions, 
including an agenda setting and implementation capacity which spans political and bureaucratic decision-making; 
This has a correlation with the author's proposal for the establishment of a tax policy committee. 
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